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I. INTRODUCTION 
The international community condemns serious human rights 
violations such as genocide, torture, enforced disappearances, and 
summary executions. When these crimes are committed in a 
particular State, the authorities have the international obligation to 
seek the truth and to prosecute and punish any person who is found 
responsible. States cannot enact amnesty laws nor grant pardons to 
prevent human rigths offenders from facing justice. 
But, what happens when tens of thousands of crimes are 
committed, for instance, in the context of armed conflicts or 
tyrannical regimes? In these scenarios, States face some structural 
obstacles that may retard or impede the investigation and prosecution 
of human rights abuses. First, because justice systems have limited 
resources, they cannot handle the extraordinary amount of cases and 
get overwhelmed by backlogs. Second, because these types of crimes 
are particularly difficult to investigate and to prove, prosecutors may 
not be able to collect sufficient evidence to convict all of the 
offenders. 
Some States allow prosecutorial discretion as a tool to deal with 
similar difficulties in the investigation and prosecution of domestic 
crimes. Granting prosecutors discretion to select cases allows them to 
reduce workloads and to allocate resources more rationally. 
Moreover, prosecutors can obtain valuable evidence by offering 
immunity to certain offenders who cooperate with the prosecution of 
other criminals. Yet, it is not clear whether international law 
authorizes prosecutorial discretion in the investigation and 
prosecution of serious human rights violations. 
This article examines the recent process of truth and justice in 
Argentina, and describes the practical difficulties that a State faces 
during the investigation and prosecution of massive human rights 
abuses. It explains why prosecutorial discretion is an useful tool to 
overcome these obstacles, and it addresses the question of whether 
international law authorizes this practice. This article supports the 
proposition that the international obligation to investigate and 
prosecute serious human rights violations should not be construed as 
prohibiting the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. But, at the same 
time, it argues that international law imposes substantive and 
procedural limits on prosecutors’ discretionary powers. In short, 
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international law only allows States to exercise some limited 
prosecutorial discretion to advance the discharge of the duty to 
investigate and prosecute, provided that it is regulated by law and 
that victims are afforded a judicial recource to control its application 
in each case. 
This article is divided into five sections. Section II describes the 
sources, scope, and rationales of the international obligation to 
investigate and prosecute serious human rights violations. Section III 
explains the structural obstacles domestic justice systems experience 
when trying to discharge that obligation. It describes the current 
process of accountability in Argentina and shows the problems that 
arise when a domestic system tries to investigate and prosecute mass 
crimes. It further explains why prosecutorial discretion is a necessary 
tool to overcome those structural obstacles. Section IV explains how 
international law regulates the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in 
these contexts. Finally, Section V draws the conclusion that the 
prohibition of prosecutorial discretion would be detrimental to the 
goals of the obligation to investigate and prosecute, and that a better 
approach is to interpret international law as regulating its exercise. 
II. THE OBLIGATION TO INVESTIGATE AND 
PROSECUTE SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS 
VIOLATIONS 
The duty to prosecute grave offences against human rights 
originally developed in the area of international humanitarian law, in 
connection with international conflicts.1 After the horrors of World 
War II, the Nuremberg Trials introduced the concept of crimes 
against humanity, which is based on the principle that fundamental 
rights are inherent to the human condition, but still requires a nexus 
with war crimes.2 However, the commission of massive abuses in 
 1.  See ANJA SEIBERT-FOHR, PROSECUTING SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS 
VIOLATIONS 2 (2009) (asserting that as early as the 1900s, the Geneva Convention 
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the 
Field of 1906 and the Tenth Hague Convention for the Adaptation to Maritime 
Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention of 1907 incorporated 
provisions punishing individual acts of ill treatment of the wounded and sick). 
 2.  See id. at 3; Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to 
Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2560 
(1991) [hereinafter Orentlicher, Settling Accounts]. 
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contexts of local conflicts and tyrannical regimes consolidated the 
idea that human rights violations are a matter of global concern 
regardless of whether they are the result of international conflicts.3 
This consensus led to the increasing development of international 
criminal law as a mechanism to prevent abuses and protect 
fundamental rights. International crimes such as genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, and torture are now considered jus 
cogens.4 That means that, among other obligations,5 States have the 
mandatory duty to prosecute or extradite perpetrators of these crimes 
(aut dedere aut judicare), and those found guilty must be punished.6 
The Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court (“ICC”)7 has 
codified these customary norms and has established an enforcing 
mechanism complementary to domestic prosecution. According to 
this scheme, States retain primary responsibility in the prosecution 
and punishment of international crimes.8 
In addition, several human rights treaties expressly require States 
to investigate and prosecute genocide, torture, enforced 
disappearances, and other offences.9 The Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,10 adopted in 
1948, was the first treaty after World War II to explicitly call for 
punishment of a practice considered to be the most heinous crime 
 3.  See SEIBERT-FOHR, supra note 1, at 3. 
 4.  M. Cherif Bassiouni, Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The 
Need for Accountability, 59 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 17 (1996). 
 5.  States also have the obligation to provide legal assistance, to eliminate 
statute of limitations, and to eliminate immunities including of heads of States.  
 6.  See Bassiouni, supra note 4, at 17. 
 7.  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (“A sentence of imprisonment shall be 
served in a State designated by the Court from a list of States which have indicated 
to the Court their willingness to accept sentenced persons.”).  
 8.  See id. (“It is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction 
over those responsible for international crimes”). 
 9.  See International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearances, Dec. 20, 2006, 2716 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Enforced 
Disappearances Convention]; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 
[hereinafter Torture Convention]; Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 
277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]; International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 10.  Genocide Convention, supra note 9.   
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against humankind.11 Under article I, the Contracting Parties 
“undertake to prevent and to punish” genocide.12 Domestic courts of 
the State party in whose territory the acts of genocide have been 
committed have primary jurisdiction.13 Article 12 of The Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment14 also requires criminal prosecution of acts of 
torture,15 which must be criminalized by States under their domestic 
law, as required by article 4.1. Finally, the International Convention 
for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances16 
establishes a detailed catalog of criminal obligations. According to 
articles 4 and 7, States must criminalize enforced disappearances 
under their domestic criminal law, establishing appropriate penalties 
in proportion to the “extreme seriousness” of the crime.17 Pursuant to 
this convention, all acts of enforced disappearance must be 
investigated and those responsible held liable. As these universal 
treaties show, there has been a tendency in international law to 
increasingly ask State Parties to prosecute and punish some 
particularly serious human rights offences.18 
In conformity with this tendency, the international and regional 
human rights bodies have recognized the obligation to investigate 
and prosecute serious human rights violations, even in absence of 
specific treaty provisions requiring such response. The Human 
Rights Committee, which supervises compliance with the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,19 has held 
repeatedly that State parties must bring perpetrators of human rights 
violations to justice.20 The Committee has explicitly required 
 11.  Orentlicher, Settling Accounts, supra note 2, at 2563-65. 
 12.  Genocide Convention, supra note 9, art. 1; see also id. art. 2 (“Contracting 
Parties agree to prevent and punish acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole 
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group . . . .”). 
 13.  For those cases in which the States’ parties failed in the investigation and 
prosecution of the crime of genocide, the Convention provided for the creation of 
an international penal tribunal.  
 14.  Torture Convention, supra note 9.   
 15.  See id. art. 12; see also id. art. 1 (providing a detailed definition of  what 
actions are considered “torture”). 
 16.  Enforced Disappearances Convention, supra note 9. 
 17.  See id. arts. 4, 7; see also id. art. 2 (defining “enforced disappearance”). 
 18.  See SEIBERT-FOHR, supra note 1, at 183. 
 19.  ICCPR, supra note 9.  
 20.  See, e.g., Barbato v. Uruguay, Communication No. 84/1981, Hum. Rts. 
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punishment for specific offences against fundamental rights, such as 
arbitrary execution and torture.21 According to the authoritative 
interpretation of the Committee, the duty to investigate, prosecute, 
and punish is inherent to the general obligation to “respect and 
ensure” the rights recognized in the Covenant, established in article 
2.1. Similarly, the Inter-American Court on Human Rights has 
derived the specific obligation to investigate, prosecute, and punish 
from the general obligation to “respect and ensure” the free and full 
exercise of fundamental rights, established in article 1.1 of the 
American Convention of Human Rights.22 In the landmark Velasquez 
Rodríquez Case,23 the Court held that “[a]s a consequence of this 
obligation, the States must prevent, investigate and punish any 
violation of the rights recognized by the Convention.”24 
The scope of the duty to investigate and prosecute, while not 
completely clear, encompasses at least the core international crimes 
of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, torture, and other 
grave offences against fundamental rights, such as extrajudicial 
executions and arbitrary detentions. Those responsible for these 
abuses as authors, instigators, or accomplices must be identified, 
tried and punished. 
States may not enact amnesty laws nor grant pardons to avoid 
compliance with their obligation to investigate gross human rights 
violations and to hold perpetrators accountable.25 There is consensus 
among the international community that serious violations of human 
rights that constitute international crimes of jus cogens cannot be 
subject to amnesties, because the obligation to prosecute is inherent 
Comm., 124, para. 11, U.N. Doc. A/38/40, U.N. GAOR, Suppl. No. 40 (1983); 
ICCPR General Comment No. 31: Nature of the General Legal Obligation 
Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant (Art. 2), Hum. Rts. Comm.,  ¶ 18, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004).   
 21.  General Comment No. 6: The Right to Life (Art. 6), Hum. Rts Comm.,  6, 
¶ 3, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (July 27, 1982); General Comment No. 20: 
Replaces General Comment No. 7 concerning Prohibition of Torture and Cruel 
Treatment or Punishment (Art. 7), Hum. Rts. Comm., 32, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev. 1 (Apr. 3,  1992).  
 22.  American Convention on Human Rights art. 1, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 
U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Convention].  
 23.  Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, ¶ 166 (July 29, 1988). 
 24.  Id.  
 25.  See generally OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS, RULE OF 
LAW TOOLS FOR POST CONFLICT STATES, U.N. Sales No. E.09.XIV.1 (2009). 
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to this category.26 International human rights bodies have made clear 
that amnesty laws are not allowed even for the purposes of 
pacification or reconciliation during democratic transitions. The 
Committee on Human Rights has rejected the argument that 
amnesties are necessary to ensure human rights after authoritarian 
regimes. To the contrary, amnesties contribute to an atmosphere of 
impunity, which may encourage further abuses.27 The Inter-
American Commission of Human Rights has held that amnesty laws 
violate numerous provisions of the Convention because they are 
contrary to the duty to ensure human rights and to the victim’s rights 
to justice and to truth.28 Likewise, the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights in Barrios Altos v. Peru29 expressly declared that 
amnesty laws intended to prevent the prosecution and punishment of 
violations of fundamental rights are inadmissible.30 
The main rationale of the obligation to investigate and prosecute 
serious human rights violations is deterrence.31 Since impunity 
encourages further violations of human rights, prosecution and 
punishment of offenders is regarded as a necessary measure to 
prevent future abuses. The deterrence foundation is implied in the 
jurisprudence of international human rights bodies, which have 
identified the obligation to investigate and prosecute as an inherent 
 26.  See, e.g., Bassiouni, supra note 4, at 21. 
 27.  See Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, Chile, ¶ 7, 
Hum. Rts. Comm., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.104 (1999); Preliminary 
Observations of the Human Rights Committee, Peru, ¶ 9, Hum. Rts. Comm., U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 67 (July 25, 1996); Rodriguez v. Uruguay, Commc’n. No. 
322/1988, ¶ 12.4, Hum. Rts. Comm., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/322/1988 (1994).   
 28.  See Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Second Report on the Situation of Human 
Rights in Peru, OEA/Ser.L/V/II/.106, doc. 59 rev. ¶ 221 (2000); Parada Cea v. El 
Salvador, Case 10.480, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 1/99, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95 doc. 7 rev.  ¶ 107 (1999). 
 29.  Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, ¶ 41 (Mar. 14, 2001). 
 30.  The Court expressly declared that:  
[A]ll amnesty provisions, provisions on prescription and the establishment of measures 
designed to eliminate responsibility are inadmissible, because they are intended to 
prevent the investigation and punishment of those responsible for serious human rights 
violations such as torture, extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary execution and forced 
disappearance, all of them prohibited because they violate non-derogable rights 
recognized by international human rights law.  
Barrios Altos, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, ¶ 41. 
 31.  Orentlicher, Settling Accounts, supra note 2, at 2600-01.  
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aspect of the duty to “respect and ensure” human rights.32 Further, 
this rationale has been explicitly announced in several international 
treaties. For instance, the Preamble of the Convention on the Non-
Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes 
Against Humanity states that “the effective punishment of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity is an important element in the 
prevention of such crimes, the protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.”33 More recently, the Rome Statute expressed 
the determination of the international community “to put an end to 
impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to 
the prevention of such crimes.”34 
In addition to the deterrence rationale, the organs of the Inter-
American human rights system have developed an independent 
justification grounded on the victims’ rights.35 This rationale regards 
the investigation, prosecution, and punishment of offenders as a 
remedy in the individual interest of victims, who are entitled to a 
“right to justice.” The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has 
derived this right from the provisions granting a right to a fair trial 
and to judicial protection.36 In the Durand and Ugarte Case,37 the 
Court held that: 
Article 8(1) of the American Convention, in connection with Article 25(1) 
thereof, confers to victims’ relatives the right to investigate their 
disappearance and death by State authorities, to carry out a process 
against the liable parties of unlawful acts, to impose the corresponding 
sanctions, and to compensate damages suffered by their relatives.38 
Thus, States must prosecute and punish serious human rights 
violations not just to prevent further abuses, but to provide justice 
and closure to the victims of the crimes already perpetrated. 
Although this independent rationale has been expressly recognized 
only in the Inter-American context, it seems to be gaining increasing 
 32.  See id. 
 33.  Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War 
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, Dec. 16, 1968, 754 U.N.T.S. 73. 
 34.  See Rome Statute, supra note 7.  
 35.  SEIBERT-FOHR, supra note 1, at 281-82. 
 36.  American Convention, supra note 22, art. 8(1), 25(1). 
 37.  Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 68 (Aug. 16, 2000). 
 38.  Id. ¶ 130. 
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acceptance in the international community.39 
In sum, the obligation to investigate and prosecute serious human 
rights violations is well established by international customary law, 
several specific human rights conventions, and the authoritative 
interpretation of universal and regional human rights treaties. This 
obligation has a broad scope and amnesty laws for these crimes have 
been expressly repudiated. The two underlying justifications of this 
duty are deterrence of further violations of human rights and the 
victim’s right to justice. 
III. THE NEED FOR PROSECUTORIAL 
DISCRETION 
A. STRUCTURAL OBSTACLES FOR THE INVESTIGATION AND 
PROSECUTION OF MASSIVE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES 
The fulfillment of the obligation to investigate and prosecute 
serious human rights violations poses a daunting challenge for States. 
After armed conflicts or dictatorial regimes, political concerns may 
discourage new governments from pursuing truth and justice.40 
Those responsible for the abuses may retain power to facilitate the 
transition and obstruct any attempt to investigate past atrocities.41 
But even when political stability is guaranteed and the authorities are 
willing to abide by the international obligation to investigate and 
prosecute, structural limits of domestic justice systems may impede 
the proper discharge of that duty.42 The special characteristics of 
 39.  See SEIBERT-FOHR, supra note 1, at 22-3 (discussing the Human Rights 
Committee’s shifting trend from viewing punishment as a means of prevention or 
deterrence to viewing punishment as a remedy). It is also indicative of this trend 
the fact that The Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law 
and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, adopted by G.A. res. 
60/147, Dec. 6 2005, expressly states that “[i]n cases of gross violations . . . 
constituting crimes under international law, States have the duty to investigate and, 
if there is sufficient evidence, the duty to submit to prosecution the person 
allegedly responsible . . . and, if found guilty, the duty to punish . . . .”). 
 40.  Orentlicher, Settling Accounts, supra note 2, at 2596-98 (illustrating that in 
Argentina, newly elected President Raul Alfonsin tried to abate protracted 
prosecution against lower-level military personnel for fear of risking a military 
uprising). 
 41.  See, e.g., id.; CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL 77 (1996). 
 42.  See Orentlicher, Settling Accounts, supra note 2, at 2596. 
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human rights abuses raise considerable practical obstacles for its 
investigation and prosecution. 
Serious human rights violations often imply the commission of 
myriad of crimes, many more than what domestic justice systems can 
process.43 Large-scale abuses perpetrated during relatively prolonged 
armed conflicts or tyrannical regimes may victimize thousands or 
even millions of individuals.44 These crimes are necessarily 
committed by large numbers of individuals, who are members of 
State agencies or similarly organized groups.45 Even well-resourced 
systems may be overwhelmed by the extraordinary amount of cases 
generated in these circumstances.46 
Moreover, the crimes committed in these contexts are particularly 
complex and difficult to prove, which make their investigation even 
more costly and time-consuming.47 For instance,  proving the 
elements of a crime against humanity is burdensome since this crime 
requires showing that the particular act charged, e.g. a murder, was 
committed in the context of a systematic and generalized attack 
against the civil population.48 Likewise, the prosecution of high-level 
offenders requires proving complex structures of command to 
connect the defendant with the specific act.49 
Additional obstacles arise from practical difficulties in collecting 
evidence of these crimes. Serious violations of human rights are 
usually committed clandestinely and offenders make deliberate 
efforts to conceal their participation and to eliminate incriminating 
 43.  See id. at 2599-2600. 
 44.  See Bassiouni, supra note 4, at 10 n.6 (providing figures of estimated 
deaths in “situations producing a high level of victimization . . . including 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes for which there has been no 
accountability”).  
 45.  See Bassiouni, supra note 4, at 1; see, e.g., NINO, supra note 41, at 10-14 
(describing the hundreds of thousands of trials that took place across Europe in the 
aftermath of World War II, indicting and trying persons who had allied with the 
Nazis). 
 46.  See Orentlicher, Settling Accounts, supra note 2, at 2596 (suggesting that 
even highly functioning judicial systems such as the criminal justice system in the 
United States could have difficulty prosecuting as many cases as Argentina was 
expected to process after the “dirty war”). 
 47.  NANCY A. COMBS, GUILTY PLEAS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: 
CONSTRUCTING A RESTORATIVE APPROACH 41 (2007). 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id.  
 
GAITAN- FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/24/2017  5:05 PM 
2017] PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION  549 
evidence.50 The archetypical example of this practice is the crime of 
enforced disappearance. By definition, this crime implies the 
suppression of any evidence, including the very person of the victim, 
and the subsequent refusal to provide information about his or her 
fate.51 Other crimes, like acts of torture committed behind the walls 
of military facilities, or summary executions in a remote rural 
community, are equally difficult to prove.52 Most of the time, the 
prosecution is unable to find witnesses of these crimes and on the 
rare occasions where witnesses are available, they may provide little 
information.53 In these situations, offenders are usually the only ones 
who know the facts and possess the necessary evidence to carry out 
the prosecutions.54 
All of these structural constraints are accentuated at the outset of 
transitions from armed conflicts or tyrannical regimes when the 
judiciary is weak and often corrupted.55 Rebuilding justice systems 
takes time, and when they are working at maximum capacity, the 
investigations are usually more difficult because of the loss of 
evidence. Finally, the normative and ethical imperative to conduct 
human rights prosecutions with the same guarantees afforded to any 
criminal defendant considerably increases costs and the pressure on 
the judicial system.56 
B. THE ARGENTINE CASE: AN HISTORICAL EXAMPLE OF THE 
STRUCTURAL OBSTACLES 
In the past decade, Argentina has been carrying on a large scale 
 50.  Diane F. Orentlicher, Bearing Witness: The Art and Science of Human 
Rights Fact-Finding, 3 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 83, 131-32 (1990) [hereinafter 
Orentlicher, Bearing Witness]. 
 51.  Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute 
Grave Human Rights Violations in International Law, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 451, 454 
(1990). 
 52.  See Orentlicher, Bearing Witness, supra note 50, at 94-95. 
 53.  See id. 
 54.  See id. 
 55.  See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 51, at 510-11 (observing that new 
governmets are fragile and easily deterred from prosecuting human rights 
violations because of the likelihood of political unrest or military uprising). 
 56.  Nancy Amoury Combs, Plea Bargains in International Criminal 
Prosecutions, in 3 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 516,  562 (M. Cherif Bassiouni 
ed., 3d ed. 2008) [hereinafter Plea Bargains]. 
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process of investigation and prosecution of past abuses.57 This 
experience demonstrates the problems that arise when a domestic 
system of criminal prosecution is required to investigate and 
prosecute all crimes committed in a context of massive violations of 
human rights.58 
During the 1976-1983 military dictatorship, the “Military Juntas” 
established a systematic plan to kidnap political dissidents, torture 
them in clandestine detention camps, and finally disappeared them.59 
According to official records, approximately 10,000 people were 
victims of these crimes; but human rights groups claim that the 
number of victims rises as high as 30,000.60 
Democratically elected President Raúl Alfonsín pushed forward a 
comprehensive transition program, which included the investigation 
of the atrocities committed during the dictatorship and the criminal 
prosecution of a few high-ranked officers.61 In 1985, a civil court 
convicted five members of the “Military Juntas” in a historic trial 
regarded worldwide as a successful experience of transitional 
justice.62 However, two military insurrections obliged the Argentine 
Congress to pass the “Full Stop Law” and the “Due Obedience Law,” 
two amnesty laws that foreclosed the prosecution of human rights 
violations.63 In 1989 and 1990, President Carlos Menem granted 
 57.  See Background: Thirty Thousand Gone, but “Never Again”, INT’L CTR. 
FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST., https://www.ictj.org/our-work/regions-and-
countries/argentina (last visited Oct. 24, 2015).  
 58.  Orentlicher, Settling Accounts, supra note 2, at 2560.  
 59.  Nunca Mas (Never Again), NAT’L COMM’N ON THE DISAPPEARNCE OF 
PERSONS (1984),  http://www.desaparecidos.org/nuncamas/web/english/library/ 
nevagain/nevagain_000.htm. 
 60.  See Uki Goni, Blaming the victims: dictatorship denialism is on the rise in 
Argentina, GUARDIAN, Aug. 29, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/ 
aug/29/argentina-denial-dirty-war-genocide-mauricio-macri. 
 61.  See See NINO, supra note 41, at 67, 69 (describing President Alfonsiden 
comprehensive plan to first, search for the disappeared persons; then to punish 
perpetrators of the disappearances by reforming the legal system; and then to 
prevent the disappearances from happening again by ratifying international human 
rights treaties and creating stronger human rights protection mechanisms). 
  62.  Cámara Nacional de Casación Penal [C.N.C.P.] [National Court of  
Appeals on Criminal Matters] 9/12/1985,  “Juicio a las Juntas Militares” 
[“Judgment of the Military Juntas”], 13/84 (Arg.), http://www.internationalcrimes 
database.org/Case/1118#p3. 
 63.  See Law No. 23.492, Dec. 24, 1986 (Arg.); see also Law No. 23.521, Jun. 
8, 1987 (Arg.).  
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pardons to those military officers convicted during the past 
administration and to several others who were still under 
prosecution, with the alleged purpose of favoring “national 
reconciliation.”64 The government position toward the past radically 
changed during  the Néstor Kirchner administration.65 In 2003, 
Congress passed an act declaring that the “Full Stop” and “Due 
Obedience” laws were null and void.66 In 2005, the Supreme Court 
declared that amnesty laws were unconstitutional in the Simón 
Case;67 and in 2007 it declared the same with respect to pardons in 
the Mazzeo Case. In this way, after almost twenty years of impunity, 
all legal barriers that prevented the investigation and prosecution of 
the crimes committed during the military regime were removed and 
hundreds of cases were reopened all around the country. 
Victims of the dictatorship and human rights groups played a key 
role in the configuration of the current process of accountability in 
Argentina. They constantly opposed the government’s measures that 
tended to foreclose criminal prosecution and developed a complex 
political and legal strategy to bring about truth and justice.68 Before 
the nullification of amnesty laws, this strategy included “truth trials,” 
criminal trials in other countries, and public demonstrations.69 After 
official investigations and prosecutions restarted, many victims and 
human rights organizations acted as private prosecutors in the 
 64.  See Daniel W. Schwartz, Rectifying Twenty-Five Years of Material 
Breach: Argentina and the Legacy of the ‘Dirty War’ in International Law, 18 
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 317, 333-34 (2004). 
 65.  Argentine Mothers Rejoice at Repeal of Amnesty Laws, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 
22, 2003), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2003-08-22/news/0308220288_1_ 
human-rights-amnesty-laws-military-officers. 
 66.  Act 25.779 entitled “Declaration of Nullity of the Due Obedience and the 
Full Stop Laws”, published on the Argentine books (Boletin Oficial de la 
República Argentina) on 9/3/2003. 
 67.  See Gaspar Forteza, Regarding Simón y Otros: Accountability in Argentina 
and International Human Rights as Domestic Positive Law, 3 FIU L. REV. 187, 
188 (2007). 
 68.  Id. at 196. 
 69.  After amnesty laws were passed precluding criminal proceedings against 
perpetrators of past human rights crimes, victims’ families sought “truth trials” in 
courts where the courts sought information about what had happened to the the 
disappeared. See Kathryn Sikkink, From Pariah State to Global Protagonist: 
Argentina and the Struggle for International Human Rights, 50 LATIN AM. POL. & 
SOC’Y 1, 1, 11-13 (2008) (lauding the Argentine use of innovative techniques and 
methods to bring perpetrators of the disappearances to justice). 
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criminal cases, as allowed by Argentine procedural law.70 Most 
victims and organizations claimed that every crime should be 
investigated and that all of those responsible should be prosecuted 
and punished.71 
Moreover, Argentine procedural criminal law prohibits the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion.72 Unlike the U.S. system, the 
Argentine system is based on the European inquisitorial model and is 
governed by the principle of mandatory prosecution.73 This principle 
requires prosecutors to promote the investigation and prosecution of 
every infraction to criminal law that comes to their knowledge.74 
They cannot forego prosecution based on economic, political, or 
practical criteria.75 These legal constraints forced prosecutors to go 
after all of the offenders for all of the crimes committed during the 
dictatorship against tens of thousands of victims.76 
During the past decade, around 500 individuals have been 
convicted on counts of crimes against humanity, and more than 1,000 
 70.  Verónica Michel & Kathryn Sikkink, Human Rights Prosecutions and the 
Participation of Victims in Latin America, 47 L. & SOC’Y REV. 873, 886-89, 891 
(2013) (asserting that after the amnesty laws were passed to prevent further 
litigation against military junta members, victims and human rights organizations 
used every method they could, including private prosecution, to keep cases open; 
on average private prosecutors kept cases open for six years longer than state 
prosecutors, thereby leading to several high profile sentencings including the 
detentions of ex-president Rafael Videla and Admiral Emilio Massera).  
 71.  See NINO, supra note 41, at 112 (stating that “[t]he human rights groups’ 
stance toward retroactive justice was intransigently retributive. They sought to 
punish each and every person responsible for the abuses, regardless of their degree 
of involvement.”); see also Claudio Tamburrini, Trading Truth for Justice?, 10 
RES PUBLICA 153 (Special Issue) (2010). For a more recent exposition of the 
retributive position, see Christopher K. Hall, The Danger of Selective Justice: All 
Cases Involving Crimes under International Law Should be Investigated and the 
Suspects, when there is Sufficient Admissible Evidence, Prosecuted, in CRITERIA 
FOR PRIORITIZING AND SELECTING CORE INTERNATIONAL CRIMES CASES 171 
(Morten Bergsmo ed., 2d ed. 2010). 
 72.  See ALEJANDRO CARRIO, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN ARGENTINA: AN 
OVERVIEW FOR AMERICAN READERS 4, 7-11 (1989).   
 73.  See id. 
 74.  Andrew S. Brown, Adiós Amnesty: Prosecutorial Discretion and Military 
Trials in Argentina, 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 203, 218 (2002). 
 75.  See id. (stating that prosecutors in Argentina are required to bring a case if 
all of the elements of the crime are satisfied). 
 76.  See id. 
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have been indicted.77 However, despite the great advances made, the 
Argentine system of criminal prosecution has faced dramatic 
difficulties in proceeding in such an extraordinary number of cases.78 
Moreover the absolute prohibition of prosecutorial discretion has 
increased the problem. Some adverse consequences of the attempt to 
investigate and prosecute every crime include: 
(1) Excessive duration of the investigations: The investigations of 
these crimes restarted exactly one decade ago, but they remain far 
from finished. Instead, the number of defendants indicted and 
victims identified continues to increase every year.79 Because of the 
slow pace of the investigations, many defendants have died before 
trial. 
(2) Excessive length of the trials: Trials against several defendants 
for many crimes are excessively lengthy and costly. For instance, a 
trial for crimes committed at the “ESMA”80 involving eighteen 
defendants and eighty-six victims lasted twenty-two months. 
According to a report prepared by the prosecutor’s office, a further 
trial involving sixty-five defendants and 793 victims would last five 
years.81 Such a lengthy trial not only entails high financial costs, but 
also a high risk that defendants die before a verdict can be 
pronounced. 
(3) De facto selection of cases: Faced with an inevitable shortage 
 77.  PROCURADURÍA DE CRIMENES CONTRA LA HUMANIDAD DEL MINISTERIO 
PUBLICO FISCAL DE LA REPUBLICA ARGENTINA [CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY UNIT 
OF THE ARGENTINE GENERAL ATTORNEY’S OFFICE], INFORME SOBRE EL ESTADO 
DE LAS CAUSAS POR VIOLACIONES A LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS COMETIDAS 
DURANTE EL TERRORISMO DE ESTADO [REPORT ON THE CAUSES OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS COMMITTED DURING THE MILITARY DICTATORSHIP] 1, 2 
(2013) [hereinafter Report on Causes of Human Rights Violations]. 
 78.  See Mirna Goransky & Maria Luisa Pique, (The Lack of) Criteria for the 
Selection of Crimes Against Humanity Cases: The Case of Argentina, in CRITERIA 
FOR PRIORITIZING AND SELECTING CORE INTERNATIONAL CRIMES CASES 91, 104 
(Morten Bergsmo ed., 2d ed., 2010) (outlining the various difficulties in the 
prosecution of the Argentine military junta including inefficiencies relating to a 
lack of prosecutorial discretion). 
 79.  Report on Causes of Human Rights Violations, supra note 77, at 2. 
 80.  The “ESMA” (School of Mechanics of the Argentine Navy) was one of the 
biggest clandestine centers of detention during the military dictatorship. See 
Goransky & Pique, supra note 78, at 102 (describing the alleged crimes committed 
at ESMA). 
 81.  Juzgado Federal 22 [Juzg. Fed.] [lower federal courts], Buenos Aires, 
30/12/2011, “ESMA” Case, Prosecutor’s Brief, unpublished. 
 
GAITAN- FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/24/2017  5:05 PM 
554 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [32:2 
of resources to investigate and prosecute all of the cases, prosecutors 
and courts are forced to prioritize, even when such practice is 
formally prohibited. The problem with de facto selection of cases is 
the risk of application of illegitimate criteria, and the lack of 
accountability for the decision not to prosecute certain cases.82 Most 
prosecutors and courts focus on the easiest cases (those more 
documented) and disregard hard cases, in which more complex 
investigations are required.83 For instance, in the investigation of the 
crimes committed in the military barracks of  Campo de Mayo the 
court and the prosecutor focused on high ranking officials and did 
not proceed with the prosecution of other offenders.84 As a 
consequence, the commander of that unit was tried and convicted six 
times for several counts of crimes against humanity,85 while other 
individuals who directly executed acts of torture or murder have not 
even been indicted yet. 
(4) Irrational allocation of resources: The requirement that every 
crime be brought to justice led to an irrational allocation of 
resources. Many offenders continue to be prosecuted regardless of 
whether it was necessary to deter further abuses or satisfy the 
victim’s rights.86 For example, in 2010 former Dictator Jorge Videla 
was indicted for 571 counts of crimes against humanity, although he 
had already been convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment, 
which was the maximum sentence.87 
(5) Incapability of solving complex cases: The crimes prosecuted 
until now are mainly those that were documented during the 1980s 
 82.  Goransky & Pique, supra note 78, at 91. 
 83.  See id. at 101 (listing the reasons Prosecutors chose to pursue certain cases 
in Argentina). 
 84.  PROCURADURIA DE CRIMENES CONTRA LA HUMANIDAD DEL MINISTERIO 
PUBLICO FISCAL DE LA REPUBLICA ARGENTINA [CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY UNIT 
OF THE ARGENTINE GENERAL ATTORNEY’S OFFICE], LISTADO DE CONDENADOS A 
JUNIO 2014 [LIST OF CONVICTIONS TO JUNE 2014] 1 (2014), 
http://www.fiscales.gob.ar/lesa-humanidad/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2014/06/ 
Lista-de-condenados-a-junio-de-2014.pdf. 
 85.  Id. at 5. 
 86.  See Goransky & Pique, supra note 78, at 104 (describing the potential 
detriment to witnesses, due process  protections, and judicial efficiency caused by 
the selection of cases in Argentina).  
 87.  Juzgado Federal [Juzg. Fed.] [lower federal courts], 25/9/2008, “Primer 
Cuerpo de Ejercito,” Indictment, La Ley [L.L.] (2008) (Arg.). 
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by CONADEP,88 the Argentine Truth Commission. Because of the 
lack of witnesses and other evidence, the system is virtually 
incapable of identifying most of the offenders who acted 
clandestinely. As a consequence, an undetermined but presumably 
high number of offenders remain unpunished.89 
(6) Surreptitious granting of immunity to defendants who appear 
as witnesses at trials: Pressed for the need for insider evidence, 
several prosecutors and courts have admitted the testimony of 
individuals implicated in the commission of the crimes as if they 
were mere witnesses.90 For example, in the case for the crimes 
committed at Campo de Mayo, a sergeant called Victor Ibáñez  
testified as a key witness for the prosecution against other offenders, 
despite his proven collaboration in the commission of the crimes.91 
This shows that the granting of immunity for cooperation is simply 
inevitable in some circumstances, even when it is formally 
prohibited.92 Regulating this practice by keeping prosecutors 
accountable before victims and society is more preferable than 
tolerating its exercise outside the law.93 
 
 88.  The CONADEP (Comision Nacional sobre la Desaparicionde Personas) 
[National Commission on the Disappearance of People] was created by President 
Alfonsrs as an essential part of his program of democratic transition. The 
CONADEP produced the report Nunca Mas (Never Again), NAT’L COMM’N ON 
THE DISAPPEARNCE OF PERSONS (1984), http://www.desaparecidos.org/nuncamas/ 
web/english/library/nevagain/nevagain_000.htm. 
 89.  Brown, supra note 74, at 219. 
 90.  See Alex Obote-Odora, Case Selection and Prioritization Criteria at the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, in CRITERIA FOR PRIORITIZING AND 
SELECTING CORE INTERNATIONAL CRIMES CASES 45, 53 (Morten Bergsmo ed., 2d 
ed. 2010) (stating the general proposition that witnesses who are also perpetrated 
should be tried as well). 
 91.  The defense attorney objected to this testimony arguing that the witness 
“served in the logistics sector at Campo de Mayo, which means that he is related to 
the events investigated even if he has not been formally charged” [translation by 
the author]. This objection was rejected by the Court. See Camara Nacional de 
Casacion [CNCP] [National Court of Appeal on Criminal Matters: highest federal 
court on criminal matters], 7/12/2012, “Riveros, Santiago Omar y otros s/recursos 
de casacion,” Registro [Register] No. 20905 (Arg.) [hereinafter CNCP Case]. 
 92.  Indeed this practice constitutes a criminal offence under Argentinean law. 
See CÓDIGO PENAL [CÓD. PEN] [CRIMINAL CODE] art. 274 (1984) (Arg.). 
 93.  Jacqueline E. Ross, The Entrenched Position of Plea Bargaining in United 
States Legal Practice, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 717, 731 (2006).  
 
GAITAN- FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/24/2017  5:05 PM 
556 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [32:2 
C. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AS A NECESSARY TOOL TO 
OVERCOME STRUCTURAL OBSTACLES 
Granting prosecutors some discretion is a legal mechanism to 
overcome structural obstacles for the investigation and prosecution 
of massive crimes. Prosecutorial discretion allows for a selection of 
cases in order to reduce workloads and optimize the allocation of 
resources.94 This power allows prosecutors to choose to forego 
punishment in certain cases with the purpose of saving financial and 
human resources to investigate other cases considered more 
important.95 Further, prosecutors can also use their discretion to 
obtain evidence of certain complex crimes. They can offer immunity 
or lenient treatment to persons implicated in the commission of 
crimes in exchange for their collaboration in the investigation and 
testimony at trial as “crown witnesses.”96 
The case of the United States powerfully illustrates the use of 
prosecutorial discretion with these aims. American prosecutors, both 
on the federal and the state level, exercise considerable discretion in 
deciding whether or not to prosecute a case.97 One of the most 
common explanations of this practice is the limitations in available 
enforcement resources.98 Prosecutors also use their discretionary 
powers to induce offenders to cooperate with the prosecution of other 
persons, acting as informants in the investigatory stage and as 
witnesses at trial, in exchange for immunity.99 Alternatively, as part 
of plea bargain negotiations, prosecutors may sign “cooperation 
agreements” reducing the sentences of offenders who agree to 
 94.  See JENIA I. TURNER, PLEA BARGAINING ACROSS BORDERS: CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE, 13 (Hiram E. Chodosh ed. 2009) (stating that case selection allows 
states to conserve limited resources so that they may be used for cases that require 
such resources).  
 95.  Id. 
 96.  See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL, 
158 (2003) (explaining that the concept of “crown witness” appeared in England in 
the 17th  century). 
 97.  See 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 13.2(a) (3d ed. 
2014) (overviewing the precedent and practice of prosecutorial discretion in the 
United States). 
 98.  Id. (“No prosecutor has sufficient resources available to prosecute all of 
the offenses which come to his attention. [Thus] the prosecutor must remain free to 
exercise his judgment in determining what prosecutions will best serve the public 
interest.”). 
 99.  Id. 
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collaborate.100 These practices are considered indispensable tools in 
the investigation and prosecution of complex crimes.101 
Prosecutorial discretion has also been increasingly applied at 
international criminal tribunals. Despite the initial reluctance to 
apply discretion in relation to core international crimes, the 
international tribunals have finally accepted it as an inevitable 
consequence of limited material resources and the difficulty to obtain 
evidence.102 The case of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”)103 is particularly demonstrative of this 
process. Originally, the ICTY’s rules did not contemplate the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion to obtain information from 
defendants in exchange for immunity.104 A proposal made by the 
United States to include a provision expressly authorizing such 
practice was rejected.105 The ICTY’s then president, Antonio 
Cassese, explained that: 
persons appearing before us will be charged with genocide, torture, 
murder, sexual assault, wanton destruction, persecution, and other 
inhuman acts. After due reflection, we have decided that no one should be 
immune from prosecution for crimes such as these, no matter how useful 
their testimony may otherwise be.106 
However, this emphatic rejection of prosecutorial discretion gave 
way to pressure from the international community to reduce the costs 
of the proceedings and to the need for the insider testimony of 
defendants.107 After the adoption of completion strategies in 2003, 
ITCY prosecutors engaged in aggressive plea bargaining, and even 
withdrew charges of genocide and crimes against humanity to obtain 
not only guilty-pleas, but also evidence against other defendants.108 
By September 2006, forty-eight defendants had been prosecuted, 
 100.  TURNER, supra note 94, at 30, 31.  
 101.  Jenia I. Turner reports that “prosecutors point out that, without the 
cooperation of insiders, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to bring down 
large-scale or sophisticated conspiracies.” Id. at 34. 
 102.  Plea Bargains, supra note 56, at 562. 
 103.  S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993). 
 104.  Plea Bargains, supra note 56, at 561. 
 105.  Id. (explaining that the gravity of the crimes at issue and the peace and 
security mission of the court appeared at odds with the process of plea bargaining). 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. 
 
GAITAN- FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/24/2017  5:05 PM 
558 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [32:2 
nineteen of whom pleaded guilty and six testified as witnesses for the 
prosecution.109 
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW ALLOWS 
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION BUT IMPOSES 
SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL LIMITS 
A. CONSTRUING THE OBLIGATION TO INVESTIGATE AND 
PROSECUTE AS ALLOWING PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 
The question of whether international law allows prosecutorial 
discretion in the investigation and prosecution of serious human 
rights violations has not been squarely addressed by international 
human rights bodies and scholars.110 Scholarly works have mainly 
focused on the limits to this obligation derived from political 
concerns, and particularly on the question of whether amnesty laws 
are admissible under international law.111 It is not surprising that 
amnesty issues have taken central stage; most States have granted 
amnesties for the atrocities committed in the past decades all around 
the world.112 However, recent pronouncements of internationals 
human rights bodies have emphatically rejected amnesties laws, 
making it necessary to consider whether there are other tools to 
handle the influx of cases. In particular, whether States may use 
prosecutorial discretion to overcome practical obstacles derived from 
structural limitations of domestic justice systems. 
General principles of construction of international obligations lead 
to the conclusion that international law does not ban the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion in the investigation and prosecution of 
massive human rights abuses. Although some decisions of 
international human rights bodies suggest that States are required to 
investigate every serious offense,113 this obligation should not be 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Ronald C. Slye, The Legitimacy of Amnesties Under International Law 
and General Principles of Anglo-American Law: Is a Legitimate Amnesty 
Possible?, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 173, 175 (2003). 
 111.  Orentlicher, Settling Accounts, supra note 2, at 2540; Roht-Arriaza, supra 
note 51, at 453.   
 112.  Slye, supra note 110, at 175 (describing examples of states granting 
amnesties). 
 113.  See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Uruguay, supra note 27, at 33 (stating that “[t]he 
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construed as imposing an impracticable task on prosecutors and the 
judiciary.114 As the Argentine case demonstrates, even if a State is 
genuinely willing to abide by international law, its domestic criminal 
systems may simply lack the operative capacity to investigate and 
prosecute every single offense when tens of thousands of crimes 
have been committed by thousands of offenders.115 No domestic 
justice system, even one of a developed country, has the operative 
capacity to prosecute all of the crimes committed in its jurisdiction. 
And, as discussed above, the investigation and prosecution of crimes 
committed in contexts of widespread violations of human rights are 
even more costly and time-consuming. 
Construing the international duty to investigate and prosecute as 
requireing States to go after those responsible for every single crime 
would be not only unrealistic, but also detrimental to the goals of the 
obligation itself. Indeed, an absolute prohibition on prosecutorial 
discretion would deprive States of a necessary tool to remove the 
structural obstacles that impede the fulfilment of that obligation, 
since prosecutorial discretion is an effective means to control the 
workloads and to obtain valuable evidence and eyewitness accounts. 
Providing prosecutors with some discretionary powers enhances their 
ability to investigate and prosecute more cases and improves the 
levels of accountability and deterrence. Therefore, prosecutorial 
discretion is plainly consistent with the idea of preventing further 
violations of human rights. 
It may be contended that the exercise of discretion in a particular 
case may infringe on the victim’s rights.116 However, admitting so is 
not to say that this practice is incompatible with international law. 
The victims’ rights to truths and justice, as fundamental rights, are 
not absolute and can be subject to reasonable limitations under 
State is obligated to investigate every situation involving a violation of the rights 
protected by the Convention.”). 
 114.  Orentlicher, Settling Accounts, supra note 2, at 2600 (“pursuant to general 
canons of construction, the comprehensive treaties should be interpreted in a 
manner that avoids imposing impossible obligations or duties whose discharge 
would prove harmful.”).  
 115.  See Goransky & Pique, supra note 78, at 105 (describing the problems 
caused by a lack of capacity in the Argentine judicial system).  
 116.  See Brown, supra note 74, at 222 (explaining that the gravity of the crime 
may make the exercise of discretion morally complicated).  
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certain circumstances.117 Limitations on these rights are justified 
when they are necessary to guarantee the rights of other victims and 
the general interest of society in knowing the truth and preventing 
further violations of human rights.118 Prosecutorial discretion is 
allowed to the extent that it allows a more comprehensive truth 
telling and a more efficient prosecution of those responsible for the 
crimes, ensuring that a larger number of victims have their rights to 
truth and justice guaranteed.119 
B. INTERNATIONAL LAW IMPOSES LIMITS TO  
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 
As just explained, the international obligation to investigate and 
prosecute should not be interpreted as prohibiting prosecutorial 
discretion in the context of gross violations of human rights. That is 
not to say, however, that every exercise of discretion is admissible. 
On the contrary, international law establishes strict conditions and 
places substantial constraints on this practice.120 Substantive and 
procedural limits may be derived from the scope of the obligation to 
investigate and prosecute, its underlying rationales, and general 
principles of international human rights law. These limits will be 
examined in turn. 
1. Substantive Limits 
Prosecutorial discretion may only be used as a tool to overcome 
actual obstacles in the functioning of the justice system that impede 
the fulfillment of the obligation to investigate and prosecute. This 
limit is a necessary consequence of the broad scope of the 
international duty. States have an obligation to investigate, prosecute, 
and punish those found guilty of serious violations of human rights 
and they must make a good faith effort to discharge that obligation to 
 117.  Frédéric Mégret, Nature of Obligations, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW 124, 141 (Daniel Moeckli et al. eds., 2010). 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  See id. (explaining that international law allows for limitations on the 
exercise of human rights when it is in the interest of promoting other’s rights). 
 120.  Bassiouni, supra note 4, at 21 (arguing that “national prosecutions [of 
international crimes] should include all persons who have committed criminal acts, 
subject however to reasonable and justified prosecutorial discretion.”). 
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the maximum of their possibilities.121 States must “organize the 
governmental apparatus and, in general, all the structures through 
which public power is exercised, so that they are capable of 
juridically ensuring the free and full enjoyment of human rights.”122 
Thus, they cannot allege their own inaction as a legitimate obstacle 
to comply with the obligation to investigate and prosecute. 
Prosecutorial discretion may be used only to overcome structural 
obstacles derived from the special characteristics of serious human 
rights violations, namely the backlogs produced by a massive 
number of cases and the difficulty of collecting evidence. 
In this aspect, lawful use of prosecutorial discretion is 
distinguishable from other outlawed measures whose main objective 
is to provide impunity, such as amnesties or pardons. As explained 
above, States may not adopt amnesties to prevent the investigation 
and prosecution of core international crimes and other grave offenses 
against fundamental rights. Accordingly, States may not circumvent 
this prohibition by applying prosecutorial discretion. Similarly, 
States may not use prosecutorial discretion to shield a defendant 
from criminal prosecution at international level. A decision to grant 
immunity to a defendant designed to prevent that person from being 
held accountable and without any useful purpose for the 
investigation and prosecution of other crimes would be contrary to 
international law. In these situations, the Rome Statute allows the 
Court to exercise its complementary jurisdiction.123 
The basic standard to determine whether a State has applied 
discretion within these bounds is straightforward: Where the result of 
prosecutorial discretion, in the general balance, is a more complete 
investigation of the crimes and a more effective prosecution of those 
responsible, the State has properly exercised that power.124 
Conversely, where the result is greater impunity than what would 
 121.  Orentlicher, Settling Accounts, supra note 2, at 2551 (stating the general 
proposition that international law requires the investigation, prosecution, and 
punishment of those who commit serious human rights abuses). 
 122.  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
 123.  Rodriguez v. Uruguay, supra note 27, at 31. 
 124.  Rome Statute, supra note 7, arts. 17(1)(b), 17(2)(a) (“the proceedings [at 
the domestic level] were or are being undertaken or the national decision was made 
for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.”). 
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have otherwise existed, the State has applied prosecutorial discretion 
beyond its limits and has failed in the fulfillment of the international 
duty to investigate and prosecute.125 
Determining whether prosecutorial discretion has been applied in a 
manner compatible with international law in a particular case is more 
complex. Prosecutorial discretion may be exercised in relation with 
(a) perpetrators, (b) victims, and/or (c) charges. Consider these 
examples: (a) a prosecutor may refrain from prosecuting a certain 
defendant in exchange for his or her cooperation in the prosecution 
of other individuals; or (b) she may decide not to prosecute the 
crimes committed against certain victims in order to reduce the 
workloads; or (c), instead of prosecuting a defendant for all of the 
crimes committed against a victim, she may withdraw some charges 
in order to reduce the length of the trial and save resources. Different 
concerns arise in each situation, and thus the standard for the 
admissibility of prosecutorial discretion differs. 
In situation (a), both deterrence and victim’s rights may be 
undercut, thus the test needs to be stringent: A prosecutor should 
only be permitted to offer leniency or immunity to a defendant if the 
benefits to the investigation outweigh the costs in terms of impunity 
and dissatisfaction of the individual interest of the victims. To 
determine the benefits, the prosecutor must consider the quantity and 
the quality of the information provided by the defendant―to what 
extent does it help to discover the truth―and the difficulty of 
obtaining that evidence by other means.126 To determine the costs, 
the prosecutor must consider the degree to which deterrence is 
jeopardized, the seriousness of the offences committed by the 
defendant and his or her culpability, and the number of individuals 
victimized by the defendant. This test would foreclose, for instance, 
the reduction of punishment to a high-level official with chief 
responsibility in the execution of thousands of crimes, but would 
allow the grant of immunity to a low ranking official who acted as a 
guard in a detention camp, who could provide inside information 
about the detained victims and the individuals who committed acts of 
torture and murders. 
 125.  Orentlicher, Settling Accounts, supra note 2, at 2598 (analyzing the theory 
and practice of the obligation to prosecute). 
 126.  Id. 
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In situation (b), the test should be similar, but focused on the 
victim’s rights that are at stake: The decision to not prosecute a 
defendant for the crimes committed against certain victims is 
permittable only if the benefits of the prosecution outweigh the 
sacrifice of the victim’s rights. To determine the benefits, the 
prosecutor must evaluate the general availability of material 
resources, the backlogs in the system, the extent of resources saved 
by the decision, and the demands for those resources to investigate 
and prosecute other crimes. To determine the sacrifice of the victim’s 
rights the prosecutor must consider the number of cases involved, the 
subjective interest of the victims in the prosecution of the defendant, 
and whether the victims have had their cases prosecuted against other 
defendants. Often, it will be unfeasible for the prosecution to charge 
a defendant with all of the crimes attributable to him.127 Consider for 
example the case of the leader of a tyrannical regime responsible for 
the enforced disappearances of tens of thousands of individuals. In 
such a situation, it would be reasonable to prosecute the offender for 
a number of cases representative of the atrocities committed that are 
sufficient to obtain the maximum punishment. The selection of cases 
should be made following objective criteria, such as the availability 
of evidence, the seriousness of the crimes, and the geographical and 
temporal distribution of the cases. Equally important, when selecting 
the cases, prosecutors must avoid discrimination against a victim or 
groups of victims based on race, ethnicity, gender, religion, or 
political ideology. 
Finally, in situation (c)—discretion in charging decisions 
involving the ame victim— the only concern is the deterrening effect 
of punishment. Here, prosecutors may exercise their discretionary 
power with greater amplitude: as long as the deterrent effect is 
ensured, the withdrawal of charges against a defendant is reasonable. 
According to this test, prosecutors may choose to charge only the 
most serious crimes and forego lesser ones.128 But it would be 
unreasonable if a prosecutor decides, for example, to prosecute a 
defendant for abduction and withdraw charges of torture and murder. 
 127.  See Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and 
Accountability of Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court, 97 
AM. J. INT’L L. 510, 520 (2003) (explaining the importance of weighing the 
logistical effects of case selection by the Prosecutor of the ICC).  
 128.  Id. 
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However, the general prohibition of discrimination imposes an 
independent limit to this power. Prosecutors may not forego the 
prosecution of certain crimes when that decision, as applied, would 
result in the discrimination against certain victims.129 For instance, a 
decision to not prosecute rape or other gender-based crimes that 
mostly affect women would be discriminatory against that collective, 
and therefore forbidden by international law. 
2.  Procedural Limits 
International law poses two procedural limits on the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion. First, victims must have a judicial recourse 
to ensure that their right to justice is not unreasonably limited by the 
decision to not prosecute their cases.130 Second, the circumstances in 
which a prosecutor may exercise discretion and the criteria for doing 
so must be determined by law.131  
These limits particularly apply in the Inter-American context, 
where a victim’s right to justice has been expressly identified as part 
of the fundamental rights recognized in the American Convention on 
Human Rights.132 According to article 25 of the Convention, 
everyone has the right to a judicial recourse  “for protection against 
acts that violate his fundamental rights” and the States Parties 
undertake “to ensure that any person claiming such remedy shall 
have his rights determined by the competent authority.”133 Therefore, 
even if victims’ individual rights to have offenders prosecuted and 
punished is not absolute and is subject to reasonable limitations, the 
holders of this right are entitled to a judicial recourse to ensure the 
decision to not prosecute does not unreasonably infringe on their 
right to justice. In other words, the victims aggrieved by the official 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  See, e.g., European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, art. 14, June 1, 2010, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (“the enjoyment 
of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without 
discrimination.”).  
 131.  See Luc Côté, Reflections on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion in 
International Criminal Law, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 162, 172 (2005) (stating the 
importance of  established and public guidelines governing the system of judicial 
recourse). 
 132.  However, as noted above, if this right is finally recognized by the 
Committee on Human Rights, this limit will apply universally. 
 133.  American Convention, supra note 22, art. 25. 
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decision to forego prosecution of certain cases or defendants must 
have the opportunity to challenge that decision before a judge. If the 
judge finds that the prosecutor has exceeded his or her discretion, the 
decision to not prosecute should be overturned and the case must go 
forward. 
In practice, this represents an important check on prosecutors’ 
discretionary powers because they do not have the last word on 
whether a case must be prosecuted or not. Admittedly, this limitation 
impairs the effectiveness of prosecutorial discretion as a tool to 
control backlogs and to obtain inside evidence. Subjecting 
prosecutors’ actions to judicial review increases the workloads on 
courts and may also discourage offenders from collaborating with the 
prosecution.134 Nevertheless, its benefits are considerably superior. It 
is the only effective way to guarantee that prosecutorial discretion is 
applied within its strict limits, and that deterrence and victims’ rights 
are not illegitimately restricted. Additionally, it requires prosecutors 
to remain accountable to victims and society about their decisions to 
not prosecute specific cases, which in turn reinforces their 
democratic legitimacy.135 
The second procedural limit is the requirement that the 
circumstances and criteria for exercising prosecutorial discretion be 
established by law.136 This is also a consequence of acknowledging 
that a decision not to prosecute certain cases implies a limitation to 
the victims’ right to justice. Like any fundamental right, limitations 
to the right to justice are justified only if they are prescribed by law, 
pursue a legitimate end, and are necessary in a democratic society.137 
 134.  Claudia Angermaier, Essential Qualities of Prioritization Criteria: Clarity 
and Precision; Public Access; Non-Political and Confidence-Generating 
Formulations; Equal and Transparent Application; and Effective Enforcement, in 
CRITERIA FOR PRIORITIZING AND SELECTING CORE INTERNATIONAL CRIMES CASES 
201, 202 (Morten Bergsmo ed., 2d ed. 2010). 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Id. at 204 (quoting the Recommendations of the Council of Europe on the 
Role of the Public Prosecution in the Criminal Justice System). 
 137.  This general principle is established in article 29(2) of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights: “In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, 
everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely 
for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms 
of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the 
general welfare in a democratic society.” G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights art. 29(2) (Dec. 10, 1948). 
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In the Inter-American context, the expression “law” has been 
interpreted as an act adopted by the legislative branch, in 
theunderstanding that this requirement is one of the most important 
guarantees against arbitrary restrictions to fundamental rights.138 The 
underlying justification is that the legislative procedure “not only 
clothes [the acts limiting basic rights] with the assent of the people 
through its representative, but also allows minority groups to express 
their disagreement, propose different initiatives, participate in the 
shaping of the political will, or influence public opinion so as to 
prevent the majority from acting arbitrarily.”139 
A democratic debate of this kind is particularly desirable in 
relation to the way States should address human rights abuses. 
Although it is clear that States have the duty to investigate and 
prosecute these crimes, international law does not―and 
cannot―provide bright line rules about how this obligation must be 
discharged.140 States have a margin of appreciation to adopt the 
measures that, in their particular situation, better satisfy the 
international obligation. The exercise of prosecutorial discretion is 
perhaps the clearest example of this. As explained above, 
international law only provides some guidelines to determine 
whether its use is valid in a particular case, but defers to State 
authorities the decision of when to use it. This decision involves 
complex policy and moral issues, on which reasonable persons may 
disagree. May prosecutors give up prosecution of any crime? May 
prosecutors grant immunity to any offender? These questions should 
be considered and decided in first place by the representatives of the 
people after a democratic deliberation, rather than by prosecutors. 
Regarding the specific circumstances, the Legislature may decide, 
for instance, that prosecutors should not forego prosecution of certain 
types of crimes or that certain classes of offenders should not benefit 
from grants of immunity. 
Admittedly, legislative regulations further limit prosecutorial 
 138.  The Word “Laws” in Article 30 of the American Convention on Human 
Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-6/86, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 6, ¶ 22 (May 
9, 1986). 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Orentlicher, Settling Accounts, supra note 2, at 2551 (stating “international 
human rights law traditionally has allowed governments substantial discretion to 
determine the means they will use to ensure protected rights.”). 
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discretion’s benefits. Certainly, prosecutors are technically more 
qualified to determine when desisting from prosecution in a 
particular case will favor the investigation and prosecution of other 
crimes. A statutory prohibition to exercise discretion in such case 
may represent an obstacle for the pursuing of that goal. Nevertheless, 
whatever cost that legislative regulation may have in terms of 
efficiency is amply paid back by the democratic legitimacy that it 
provides to prosecutorial discretion in the permitted cases. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The international obligation to investigate and prosecute serious 
human rights violations is in tension with the capacity of domestic 
judicial system to process extraordinary amounts of cases. As the 
case of Argentina shows, when a domestic system is required to 
investigate and prosecute all of the crimes committed in a context of 
massive violations of human rights, the outcome may be that more 
cases remain unsolved and a larger number of offenders goes 
unpunished. Indeed, if the system is unable to control the workloads, 
it may rapidly become overwhelmed by the number of cases and find 
itself incapable of carrying all of the investigations in an efficient 
manner. The more time it takes to solve the cases and prosecute 
those responsible, the more difficult it becomes to bring them to 
justice. Material evidence may be lost, witness may become 
unavailable, memories may fade, and defendants may flee or die. 
Moreover, if prosecutors are deprived of the power to grant 
immunity to obtain insider testimony, it is possible that many cases 
will be never solved or prosecutors will find ways to engage in this 
practice at the margin of the law. 
This practical experience suggests that the international obligation 
to investigate and prosecute should not be interpreted as prohibiting 
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. A better approach is to 
conclude that international law allows States to exercise 
prosecutorial discretion in order to overcome structural obstacles in 
the investigation and prosecution of serious human rights offenses. 
This power may be used to control workloads by foregoing 
prosecution of certain cases and to obtain evidence by granting 
immunity or leniency to defendants who cooperate with the 
prosecution. 
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However, international law also poses substantive and procedural 
limits to this practice. Prosecutorial discretion may be used only as a 
tool to advance in the discharge of the international obligation to 
investigate and prosecute, and never as a mechanism to circumvent 
that responsibility. Moreover, victims aggrieved by a decision to not 
prosecute a case should have the opportunity to challenge that 
decision before a judge and States should determine by law the 
criteria and circumstances in which prosecutorial discretion may be 
applied. When applied within these limits, prosecutorial discretion 
contributes to the deterrence of further abuses of human rights and 
guarantees victims’ rights to justice, which are the main rationales of 
the international obligation to investigate and prosecute serious 
human rights violations. 
This article is intended to start a new discussion on the transitional 
justice field. While classic scholarly works on transitional justice 
focused on which responses emerging democratic governments 
should undertake regarding past abuses, this article addresses the 
practical difficulties that States face when they actually try to 
investigate and prosecute massive crimes, the use of prosecutorial 
discretion as a tool to deal with those difficulties, and the regulation 
of this practice under international law. This analysis may be of use 
to those nations determined to seek truth and justice. 
